

## 课程大纲

课程编号: 02804040                      授课对象: IPHD students  
 课程名称: 组织理论研讨                英文名称: Seminars in Organization Theory  
 周学时/总学时: 3/36                    学 分: 2  
 任课教师: 孔繁敏                        开课学期: Spring, 2013  
 先修课程: Microeconomics, Organizational Behavior, Organization Theory and Design

任课教师联系方式: Fanmin Kong, Ph.D.              Guanghua School of Management  
 Office: 443 GSM Bldg. #2; Tel: (010) 6275 3198  
 Email: [fkong@gsm.pku.edu.cn](mailto:fkong@gsm.pku.edu.cn); [kong0024@umn.edu](mailto:kong0024@umn.edu)

辅导、答疑时间: Free walk-ins open to the seminar participants on Wednesday afternoons, or by individual appointment.

## O. 项目培养目标

学习目标 1 系统掌握从事学术研究所需要的专业知识及理论。

具体目标 1、系统掌握本学科基础知识及基本理论

具体目标 2、掌握本学科前沿知识和理论、具有足够的相关领域的知识

具体目标 3、熟练掌握本学科的研究方法

学习目标 2 具有从事创新性研究的能力; 能够撰写并发表高质量的毕业论文和学术论文

具体目标 1、撰写高质量的毕业论文和学术论文

具体目标 2、具有高水平的分析能力和批判思维能力, 能够创造性地解决问题

学习目标 3 具有宽阔的国际视野, 能够与国际学者进行交流、合作的能力。

具体目标 1、具有优秀的口头交流和文字交流能力

具体目标 2、能够熟练地运用至少一门外语进行学术交流与沟通

学习目标 4 了解学术伦理, 具有强烈的社会责任感、关注社会问题

具体目标 1、了解社会责任感的重要性

具体目标 2、了解学术生涯中的学术道德问题

具体目标 3、关注现实社会问题

## 一、课程概述 (Introduction)

Organization theory is concerned with the study of the behavior and performance of groups and units in organizations, and the behavior of organizations in markets and the economy at large, predominantly from the perspectives of economics, sociology and political sciences.

The related field of organizational behavior concentrates on the behavior and performance of individuals in organizations, mostly from the perspective of psychology. However, in order to understand how groups and organizations behave, interact, and perform, it is necessary to have a clear understanding of how individuals operate in different situations. The purpose of this seminar is to explore a few topics, impart key economic concepts necessary for understanding important ideas in organization theory, and help bring an organization-theoretic perspective on various issues in human resources and industrial relations.

## 二、课程目标（包括学生所提高的技能要求）(Purpose of the Seminar)

The weekly seminar meetings will be dedicated to discussion, under the guidance of a discussion leader. This is a reading and writing-intensive seminar. Some of the technical economic writing, particularly mathematical models, may be difficult to comprehend fully; you will need to read beyond the math and jargon. I welcome conversations about the seminar materials and about your work (and mine); please feel free to drop by my office on Wednesdays when I am available (or make an appointment in advance).

My teaching philosophy is to draw a road map of OT research for doctoral students and lead them to build a strong interest in related topics, in addition to teaching them the systematic knowledge of, and evolution in the field. As expected, I hope all seminar participants could learn major theoretical and empirical works through intensive reading and discussions of OT literature, and yet to develop an organizational term paper on their own.

## 三、内容提要及学时分配 (Contents and Schedule)

The topics that will be covered in the seminar belong to two broad areas: (1) different approaches to the study of organizations, while emphasizing more economics-inspired approaches, and (2) selected topics in growing areas of research in HRIR-oriented organization theory. This seminar will not cover the topics and perspectives covered in the alternate-year OB/HR seminars, taught by a psychologist or a sociologist or by myself. The principal topics that will be covered in the seminar are:

- Basic issues in organizations
- Different approaches and tools in organization theory (selective)
- The firm and the market
- Individual behavior: self-interest, identity, values, and rationality
- Governing relationships: hierarchies, contracts, trust, and reciprocity
- Agency theory and game theory: tools and substance
- Incentives, profit sharing, team theory, and employee involvement
- The determinants and consequences of organizational structure: practices, programs, bundles, and systems
- Ownership of the firm and alternative forms of organization: for-profit firms, nonprofit organizations, employee ownership, cooperatives, and government-owned firms

- Organizational life cycles: birth, growth, and demise

I am providing a minimal reading list; I will suggest more readings as we go along. In addition, each of you will provide a reading list, as described below. Here are some details and readings.

### **Week 1, February 26, 2013**

*An Introduction to the Seminar Topics: An Overview*  
*Seminar Set-up: Administrative Issues*

### **Week 2, March 5, 2013**

Discussion leader:

#### ***Basic issues in organizations***

1. Ben-Ner, Avner, John Michael Montias, and Egon Neuberger (1993). "Basic Issues in Organizations: A Comparative Perspective," *Journal of Comparative Economics*, **17**: 207-42.
2. Putterman, Louis and Randall S. Kroszner (1996). "The economic nature of the firm: a new introduction," in Putterman, Louis, and Randall Kroszner (eds.), pp. 1-31, *The Economic Nature of the Firm*, Cambridge University Press.
3. Gibbons, Robert (2003). "Team Theory, Garbage Cans, and Real Organizations: Some History and Prospects of Economic Research on Decision-Making in Organizations." *Industrial and Corporate Change*, **12**: 753-87.
4. [Lawler III., Edward E. and Christopher G. Worley (2006). "Chapter 1: Why Build Organizations to Change," in *Built to Change: How to Achieve Sustained Organizational Effectiveness*, pp.1-22, Jossey-Bass, A Wiley Imprint, San Francisco, CA 94103.]<sup>1</sup>

### **Week 3, March 12, 2013**

Discussion leader:

#### ***The theory of the firm: The firm and the market***

1. Coase, Ronald (1937), "The Nature of the Firm," *Economica*, **4**: 386-405; reprinted with minor abridgements in Putterman and Kroszner (1996), Ch 7, pp. 89-104.
2. Chandler, Alfred (1977), "Introduction: the visible hand", from *The Visible Hand*; reprinted in Putterman and Kroszner (1996), Ch 6, pp. 78-85.

---

<sup>1</sup> Readings put into square brackets are encouraged to read but not required for the session.

3. Gibbons, Robert (2005). "Four formal(izable) theories of the firm?" *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, **58**: 200–245.
4. Casson, Mark (2005). "Entrepreneurship and the theory of the firm?" *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, **58**: 327–348.
5. [Williamson, Oliver E. (1985). "The limits of firms: incentives and bureaucratic features" Chapter 6 of *The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets and Relational Contracting*; reprinted in Putterman and Kroszner, Ch11, pp 146-161.]
6. [Milgrom and Roberts (1992): *Coordination: Markets and Management*, pp. 55-124]

#### **Week 4, March 19, 2013**

Discussion leader:

##### ***The Firm and the society: Business ethics and corporate social responsibility***

1. Shaffer, Brian (1995). "Firm-level Responses to Government Regulation: Theoretical and Research Approaches", *Journal of Management*, **21(3)**: 495-514.
2. Kochan, Thomas A. and Saul A. Rubinstein (2000). "Toward a Stakeholder Theory of the Firm: The Saturn Partnership", *Organization Science*, **11(4)**: 367-386.
3. Ghoshal, Sumantra (2005). "Bad management theories are destroying good management practices", *Academy of Management Learning & Education*, **4(1)**: 75-91.
4. Tan, Justin (2009). "Institutional Structure and Firm Social Performance in Transitional Economies: Evidence of Multinational Corporations in China", *Journal of Business Ethics*, DOI 10.1007/s10551-009-0913-y, **86**: 171-189.
5. [Hardy, Charles O. (1945). "Schumpeter on Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy", *Journal of Political Economy*, **53(4)**: 348-356.]
6. [Chen, Ying and David Touve (2009). "Conformity, political participation, and economic rewards: The case of Chinese private entrepreneurs", *Asia Pacific Journal of Management*, DOI 10.1007/s10490-009-9171-2. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com.]

#### **Week 5, March 26, 2013**

Discussion leaders:

##### ***Agency theory: standard and development***

1. Jensen, Michael and Meckling, William (1976). "Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure", *The Journal of Financial*

- Economics*, **3**: 305-360; reprinted in Putterman and Kroszner, Ch23, pp. 315-335.
2. Fama, Eugene (1980). "Agency problems and the theory of the firm", *Journal of Political Economy*, **88**: 288-307; reprinted in Putterman and Kroszner, Ch. 22, pp. 302-314.
  3. Prendergast, Canice (2002). "The Tenuous Trade-off between Risk and Incentives," *Journal of Political Economy*, **110(5)**: 1071-1102.
  4. DeVaro, Jed and Fidan A. Kurtulus (2010). "An Empirical Analysis of Risk, Incentives and the Delegation of Worker Authority," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, **63(4)**: 637-657.
  5. [Milgrom, Paul and John Roberts (1992), *Economics, Organization, and Management*, Prentice Hall, Ch. 5-6 (Bounded Rationality and Private Information, and Moral Hazard and Performance Incentives) ]
  6. [Ben-Ner, Avner, Fanmin Kong, and Stephanie Lluís (2012). "Uncertainty, task environment, and organization design: An empirical investigation" *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, **82(1)**: 281–313.]

### **Week 6, April 2, 2013**

Every seminar member may think and prepare a two-page outline of the contemplated term paper proposal.

Discussion leaders:

#### ***Organization Software: identity, values, culture, and rationality***

1. Greif, Avner (1994). "Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies," *Journal of Political Economy*, **102**: 912-950.
2. Akerlof, George A. and Rachel E. Kranton (2000). "Economics and Identity." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, **115(3)**: 715-753.
3. Akerlof, George A. and Rachel E. Kranton (2005). "Identity and Economics of Organizations." *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, **19(1)**: 9-32.
4. Langlois, Richard (2003). "Cognitive comparative advantage and the organization of work: Lessons from Herbert Simon's vision of the future," *Journal of Economic Psychology*, **24**: 167-187.
5. [Ben-Ner, Avner and Louis Putterman (1998). "Values and Institutions in Economic Analysis", in Avner Ben-Ner and Louis Putterman, eds., *Economics, Values, and Organization*, Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 3-72.]

### **Week 7, April 9, 2013**

Discussion leaders:

***Organizational culture: an economic perspective***

1. Kreps, David M. (1996). "Corporate Culture and Economic Theory" in Peter J. Buckley, Jonathan Michie (ed.) *Firms, organizations, and contracts: a reader in industrial organization*, pp. 221-275. Oxford University Press, New York.
2. Carrillo, Juan D. and Denis Gromb (1999). "On the strength of corporate cultures", *European Economic Review*, **43**: 1021-1037.
3. Hermalin, Benjamin E. (2001). "Economics and Corporate Culture." Chapter 10 in C. Cooper, S. Cartwright, and P. Earley (Eds.). *The International Handbook of Organizational Culture and Climate*. Chichester, England: John Wiley & Sons.
4. Teraji, Shinji (2008). "Culture, effort variability, and hierarchy" *Journal of Socio-Economics*, **37**: 157-166.
5. [Cordes, Christian, Peter J. Richerson, and Georg Schwesinger (2010). "How corporate cultures coevolve with the business environment: The case of firm growth crises and industry evolution", *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, **76**: 465-480.]
6. [Throsby, David (2001). *Economics and Culture : an introduction*, Cambridge University Press. A copy can be downloaded from <http://wiki.theatercalarts.com/images/6/61/Throsby.pdf>]

**Week 8, April 16, 2013**

Discussion leaders:

***Governing employment relationships (I): hierarchies and relational contracts***

1. Williamson, Oliver E. (1985). "The governance of contractual relations", Chapter 3 of *The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets and Relational Contracting*; reprinted in Putterman and Kroszner, Ch. 9, pp. 125-135.
2. Garicano, Louis (2000). "Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 108, No. 5, pp. 874-904.
3. Hart, Oliver and John Moore (2005). "On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination versus Specialization." *Journal of Political Economy* **113(4)**: 675-702.
4. Baker, George, Robert Gibbons, and Kevin J. Murphy (2002). "Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, **117**: 39-83.
5. [Hart, Oliver and John Moore (1999). "Foundations of Incomplete Contracts." *Review of Economic Studies* **66**: 115-38.]
6. [Hayek, Friedrich A. (1945). "The Use of Knowledge in Society," *The American Economic Review*, **35(4)**: 519-530. (Sept.); reprinted in Putterman and Kroszner, Ch 6, pp. 66-71]

**Week 9, April 23, 2013**

Discussion leaders:

***Governing employment relationships (II): trust and reciprocity***

1. Williamson, Oliver E., Michael Wachter, and Jeffrey Harris (1975). "Understanding the employment relation: the analysis of idiosyncratic exchange," *The Bell Journal of Economics*, **6**: 250-278; reprinted in Putterman and Kroszner, Ch. 16, pp. 233-253.
2. Akerlof, George (1982). "Labor contracts as partial gift exchange", *Journal of Economics*, **47(4)**: 543-569; reprinted in Putterman and Kroszner, Ch. 19, pp. 276-287.
3. Prendergast, Canice, and Robert H. Topel (1996). "Favoritism in Organizations," *Journal of Political Economy*, **104(5)**: 958-978.
4. Buchan, Nancy R., Eric J. Johnson, and Rachel T.A. Croson (2006). "Let's get personal: An international examination of the influence of communication, culture and social distance on other regarding preferences" *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, **60**: 373-398.
5. [Ben-Ner, Avner, Louis Putterman, Fanmin Kong, and Dan Magan (2004). "Reciprocity in a Two Part Dictator Game," *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, **53**: 333-352.]
6. [Fehr, Ernst & Klaus M. Schmidt (2005). "[The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism – Experimental Evidence and New Theories](#)," [Discussion Papers](#) 66, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.]

**Week 10, April 30, 2013**

Discussion leader:

***Ownership of the firm and alternative forms of organization:***

1. Demsetz, Harold (1983). "The structure of ownership and the theory of the firm", *Journal of Law and Economics*, **26**: 375-390 ; reprinted in Putterman and Kroszner, Ch. 25, pp 345-353
2. Hart, Oliver (1989). "An economist's perspective on the theory of the firm", *Columbia Law Review* **89**: 1757-1774; reprinted in Putterman and Kroszner, Ch. 26, pp. 354-360.
3. Putterman, Louis (1993). "Ownership and the nature of the firm", *Journal of Comparative Economics*, **17**: 243-263; reprinted in Putterman and Kroszner, Ch. 27, pp. 361-369.

4. Ben-Ner, Avner, (2003) "For-Profit, State, and Nonprofit: How to Cut the Pie among the Three Sectors." Working Paper. A copy can be downloaded from <http://ideas.repec.org/p/hrr/papers/0304.html>
5. [Hart, O., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. 1997. "The Proper Scope of Government." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, **112**(4): 1127-1161.]
6. [Hansmann, Henry, 1996: *The Ownership of Enterprise*. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, pp. 1-49.]

### **Week 11, May 7, 2013**

Discussion leader:

#### ***Organizational life cycles: birth, growth, and demise***

1. Ben-Ner, Avner (1988). "The Life Cycle of Worker-Owned Firms in Market Economies: A Theoretical Analysis," *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, **10**: 287-313; reprinted in *Producer Cooperatives and Labor-Managed Systems* (David Prychitko and Jaroslav Vanek, eds.), Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 1996.
2. Agarwal, Rajshree and Michael Gort (2002). "Firm and Product Life Cycles and Firm Survival," *American Economic Review*, Papers and Proceeding, May, pp. 184-190.
3. Hannan, Michael T. (2005). "Ecologies of Organizations: Diversity and Identity." *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, **19**(1): 51-70.
4. von Rhein, Kristina, (2008) "Heritage and Firm Survival - An Analysis of German Automobile Spinoffs 1886-1939." *Economics Bulletin*, **12**(13): 1-8
5. [Milgrom and Roberts (1992): Ch 17," The Evolution of Business and Economic Systems"]
6. [Nicholls-Nixon, Charlene L. (1995). "Responding to technological change: Why some firms do and others die?" *The Journal of High Technology Management Research*, **6**(1): 1-16.]

Final papers (proposals) are due by the midnight on **May 21, 2013** if you want a grade by the end of the semester. Otherwise, I will give you an incomplete on the seminar score report.

#### 四、教学方式 (Classroom Teaching)

Classroom discussion and presentation are major activities in this seminar course, whereas I shall direct and control the progress whenever deemed necessary.



All registered seminar participants are required to read the assigned readings before seminar meeting each week. In addition, each of you should hand in a reading note about the papers, which states what that main themes you learn from the readings, the difficulties you have as well as the reflections that incurred to you. Your questions will also be discussed in class.

#### 五、教学过程中 IT 工具等技术手段的应用 (IT Technology)

No fancy IT technology needed!

#### 六、教材 (Required Books and Journal Papers)

- \* Putterman, Louis, and Randall Kroszner (Eds.). 1996. *The Economic Nature of the Firm*, Cambridge University Press
- \* Milgrom, Paul, and John Roberts. 1992. *Economics, Organization and Management*. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

In addition to the textbooks listed above, we will read many journal papers that are readily available either from PKU Library system or my archive.

#### 七、参考书目 (Supporting Materials)

- \* Hansmann, Henry. 1998. *The Ownership of Enterprise*. Harvard University Press.
- \* Gibbons, Robert. 1999. *Game Theory for Applied Economists*. Princeton University Press
- \* Hannan, Michael T., and John Freeman, 1989. *Organizational Ecology*, Harvard University Press
- \* Geisler, Eliezer. 1999. *Methodology, Theory, and Knowledge in the Managerial and Organizational Sciences: Actions and Consequences*. Quorum Books, Westport, CT.
- \* Ben-Ner, Avner, and Louis Putterman. (eds.) *Economics, Values, and Organization*, Cambridge University Press, 1998

#### 八、教学辅助材料, 如 CD、录影等 (Multimedia)

There are no other supporting materials for this seminar course.

#### 九、课程学习要求及课堂纪律规范 (Classroom Rules)

The weekly seminar meetings will be led by discussion leader(s). The discussion leader will identify key issues, and will lead the group discussion. The discussion leader will have therefore to read the materials more carefully, and read a little beyond the assigned readings.

Each seminar member will lead two class meetings (depending on the total number of seminar participants, each session leader may team up with another member). Please forward to me your choice of *three* topics you would like to lead – I will try to schedule and finalize the discussions on the basis of your preferences during the first class meeting.

Every week seminar members will write at least three pages summarizing their observations about the readings. Each commentary will include a critical summary of the required readings. (refer to ‘Classroom Teaching’ above)

#### 十、学生成绩评定办法（需详细说明评估学生学习效果的方法）(Grading)

Course grade: 50% paper, 25% active participation plus reading homework, 25% presentations. The paper will be evaluated for the thoroughness of ideas, the care taken in exploring actual cases in light of theoretical concepts, clarity of exposition, and the general presentation of ideas. Participation will be evaluated for the extent of preparation for class discussion and active participation in it. The presentations will be evaluated for clarity, and for responsiveness to questions and comments.